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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this article is to evaluate the fiscal effects of changes in social 
contribution rates in Russia for the period 2010–2014, which was marked by 
significant changes in tax legislation. The consequences of these changes for both 
the budget system and the labor market still have not been thoroughly studied. 
As the empirical and theoretical research shows, taxation could influence the labor 
market in two ways: through the intensive and extensive margin. This study tests 
the hypothesis about the two kinds of effects of taxation for Russia by using the data 
of the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey. It is demonstrated that an increase 
in the social contribution rate causes a decline in labor participation both for women 
and men. Moreover, an increase in the social contribution rate causes a reduction 
in the net-of-tax wage level for women and men. The state has already exhausted 
the opportunities for raising social contributions and pushing the reforms further 
would mean jeopardizing budget revenues and fiscal sustainability. Generally, 
an increase in social contributions has had a negative impact on the government’s 
revenues from social contributions and the personal income tax. It can be concluded 
that in general, the fiscal effects of the reforms were negative rather than positive. 
We would recommend the government to reconsider the current social contribution 
rates. Since the labour market is highly sensitive, it is possible to raise tax revenue 
through other means, thus avoiding adverse effects on public welfare.
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АННОТАЦИЯ
Целью статьи является количественная оценка бюджетных эффектов от из-
менения ставок страховых взносов за период 2010–2014 гг., который отметил-
ся значительными изменениями в налоговом законодательстве. Последствия 
этих изменений, как для бюджетной системы, так и рынка труда в России до 
сих пор слабо изучены, в частности, как изменения ставок по страховым взно-
сам повлияли на налогооблагаемую базу. Согласно эмпирическим и теорети-
ческим работам, имеют место два канала влияния налогообложения на рынок 
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труда: интенсивность труда и участие в рабочей силе. В работе тестируются 
гипотезы о наличии этих двух каналов. Оценка производится на основе базы 
данных Российского мониторинга экономического положения и здоровья на-
селения. Получены следующие результаты. При увеличении ставки по стра-
ховым взносам участие в трудовой деятельности снижается как для женщин, 
так и для мужчин. Также при увеличении ставки по страховым взносам чистая 
заработная плата также уменьшается для женщин и мужчин. В текущих эко-
номических условиях налоговое бремя по страховым взносам уже избыточно, 
а возможности для повышения ставок страховых взносов не просто исчерпа-
ны, а несут риски для пополнения бюджета и для бюджетной устойчивости. 
В целом повышение страховых взносов негативно сказалось на поступлениях 
страховых взносов и налога на доходы физических лиц. Бюджетные эффекты 
от проведённых реформ следует признать отрицательными. В качестве реко-
мендации следовало бы пересмотреть величину ставок по страховым взно-
сам. В условиях высокой чувствительности рынка труда возможно обеспечить 
большую пополняемость бюджета без создания негативных эффектов на уро-
вень общественного благосостояния.
КЛЮЧЕВЫЕ СЛОВА
бюджетные эффекты, участие на рынке труда, налоговое законодательство, на-
логовые поступления, налогообложение труда, нелинейность налоговой шка-
лы, процедура Хекмана, страховые взносы
1. Introduction
Even though employer is the formal 
taxpayer of social contributions from the 
perspective of tax legislation, a part of the 
tax burden could be shifted to employees. 
It happens when the net wage (earned by 
an employee) becomes smaller because 
of a new tax is introduced or the rate of 
the existing tax is raised. Social security 
contributions are deducted from the gross 
wage when calculating the net wage, 
which is why social contributions used to 
be viewed as a private case of labor taxa-
tion [1–6]. Moreover, in OECD reports on 
tax statistics1, social contributions are con-
sidered when calculating the “tax wedge” 
indicator. Between 2010 and 2014, there 
were some serious changes in the rates 
of social contributions in Russia. These 
reforms were primarily driven by the 
government’s desire to boost its fiscal re- 
venues and therefore to have the source 
for financing a pension increase. For exam- 
ple, in 2010 the basic social contribu-
tion rate was raised from 26% to 34% in 
2011. Afterwards, in 2012 it was lowered 
to 30% and at the same time the rate after 
the threshold was increased to 10%. These 
changes seem to be inconsistent, as if the 
1 OECD Tax Database: Explanatory Annex, 
Part 3: Social Security Contributions; 2019.
Russian government by trial and error was 
trying to find the optimal social contribu-
tion schedule. However, the consequences 
of these changes for both the budget sys-
tem and the labor market in Russia are still 
poorly understood. It is still not quite clear 
how the changes in social contributions 
rates affected the tax base. 
The purpose of this study is to de-
velop approaches that can help assess 
the fiscal effects caused by changes in 
social contributions rates in Russia. On 
one hand, the fiscal revenues from social 
contributions were growing in 2010–2014 
(from 5.3% of GDP in 2010 to 6,3% of GDP 
in 2014). On the other hand, the shortage 
of fiscal revenues from the personal in-
come tax (measured as a share of GDP) in 
2011–20122 could be probably connected 
with the growth in social contribution 
tax rates due to the common tax base (la-
bor income). To test this hypo-thesis, one 
should isolate the effect of the changing 
rates from other factors. 
Thus, there are several hypotheses 
which will be accepted or rejected de-
pending on the results of this study:
– the above-mentioned increase in so-
cial contribution rates in 2010–2014 caused 
(ceteris paribus) the decline in fiscal re- 
2 The period of the most dramatic increase in 
labor income tax burden of 2010–2014.
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venues from the personal income tax and 
social contributions;
– this decline was a result of the elastic 
(to tax rates) tax base;
– the shrinking tax base occurred due 
to the drop in labor particapation and the 
cutback of net-of-tax wages
If these hypotheses are not rejected, 
it means that the main goal of these tax 
reforms had not been achieved. More-
over, it brings us to the discussion of what 
more effective changes in labor income tax 
schedule could be. 
The structure of this paper is as fol-
lows. Our literature review deals with the 
theoretical literature in order to identify 
the channels of influence of income taxa-
tion on the labor market and with empiri-
cal works in order to determine possible 
methods for quantitative assessment of 
the effects of labour income taxation. 
The section “Data and Methodology” 
describes the main changes in the collec-
tion of social contributions in Russia in 
2010–2014. Based on the constructed theo-
retical model, we derived the specification 
of the econometric equation for assessing 
the elasticity of the labor supply at the rate 
of social contributions. Our estimates rely 
on the data from the Russian Longitude 
Monitoring Survey (RLMS).
The following sections present our 
econometric assessment of the effects and 
interpretation of the results of analysis.
2. Literature review
The peculiarity of social contribu-
tions in Russia lies in the fact that there 
is a rather weak connection between so-
cial contributions and social benefits that 
an employee or a self-employed person 
is entitled to if an insurance case occurs. 
Therefore, it is expedient to consider so-
cial contributions as a form of tax, in fact, 
it is important to highlight the gratuitous 
nature of these payments. Thus, social 
contributions, along with the personal in-
come tax, are taxes on labor income. 
The development of the scholarly in-
terest in labor taxation began precisely 
with the effects related to the intensity 
of labor (e.g. high-income tax rates crea-
te incentives to work and earn less). In 
particular, the key point of interest is the 
elasticity of the labor income tax base [7]. 
Early studies focused on tax rate changes 
such as the factor of labor supply and de-
mand [8; 9]. The estimation of labor sup-
ply and demand, however, poses several 
problems. The first one appears because 
the use of microdata still demonstrates 
little variation in hours of work3, which 
is why studies based on microdata (like 
this paper) estimate the elasticity of labor 
income but not that of labor supply (or 
demand) measured in hours of work, as 
in [10]. According to this approach, the 
variation in efforts of an employer with 
fixed working time corresponds to the 
variation in wages [11].
However, dealing with the studies 
examining the effects of labor taxation, 
we should keep in mind that the decision 
about whether to work or not can also be 
endogenous with respect to changing tax 
rates. This problem has received little at-
tention, because the early studies [7–9] 
considered the supply of labor of men who 
were supposed to have a low elasticity of 
participation, which is why the literature 
often neglected the effects associated with 
labor participation [12]. The main problem 
in analyzing the effects of labor force par-
ticipation is that it is necessary to consider 
individuals who are not currently work-
ing [13; 14]. Consequently, it is impossible 
to determine the characteristics that are 
important for the analysis, for example, 
the level of labor income [15]. At the same 
time, the exclusion of those people who 
do not work can lead to the problem of 
non-random selection, which leads to a 
significant bias in the estimates of elas-
ticities [16]. In the academic literature, this 
econometric problem could be solved by 
using non-random selection models (cen-
sored regression). This approach is widely 
used in labor market studies (for example, 
in [16–18]). The pioneering work in this 
respect was [19], which for the first time 
investigated selection bias as the authors 
proposed a censored regression metho-
dology. Subsequently, this approach was 
3 Little variation in hours of work is the story 
typical of microdata, but not microdata.
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implemented many times to obtain un-
biased estimates of elasticities.
Another problem is the nonlinearity 
of the tax scale (for example, progressive 
or regressive personal income taxes). In 
this case, the estimates of elasticity would 
be biased due to the two-sided connection 
between tax rate and labor income. For 
example, the more income one has, the 
higher marginal tax rate will be applied 
in the case of progressive tax schedule. 
It means that not only does labor income 
depend on the tax rate, but the tax rate 
depends on labor income [20; 21]. In [11], 
it was proposed to add to the equation a 
variable characterizing the displacement 
of the budget constraint (so-called virtual 
income). 
The last but not least is the problem 
of heterogeneity of elasticity among dif-
ferent sociodemographic groups (dif-
ferences due to gender [22], to age and 
level of education [23], to marital status 
and number of children [24], to distribu-
tion of income [25]). The solution is to 
use sociodemographic characteristics as 
control variables or to cluster the sample 
according to some of them. The effect is 
usually the most heterogeneous due to 
gender [18; 22].
Summing up, the estimation of the ef-
fects of the labor income tax rate on the tax 
base should be divided into two compo-
nents:
1) The magnitude in labor intensity 
(intensive margin) associated with how 
much more / less individuals began to 
work.
2) The magnitude of participation in 
the labor force (extensive margin) associ-
ated with an individual’s decision to work 
or not.
3. Data and methodology
As a point of departure for our analy-
sis, we are going to use the model from 
[15] and add social contributions. This 
model is a modification of the classical 
problem of the choice between the level 
of leisure and consumption. Modifica-
tion of this model consists primarily in 
the fact that one of the parameters of the 
utility function is not the number of hours 
worked but the labor income. Thus, the 
individual’s utility function is defined as 
follows:






C is the level of consumption of an in-
dividual;
LI is the labor income of an individual.
Since LI = w · l, where is the hourly 
wage and l the number of working hours, 
this individual’s utility function is not 
monotonic in variable LI.
Now let us formulate an optimization 
problem for an individual who would like 
to conceal some of their income to pay less 
taxes. The individual maximizes his utility 
in accordance with the budget constraint, 
which implies the possibility of tax eva-
sion. Moreover, it is important to note that 
concealment occurs simultaneously – the 
invidivual evades social security contribu-
tions and income tax (1). 
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(1)
NLI is the individual’s nonlabor income;
( ) ( ), 
inc soc
X XT T  are social functions of taxation 
of labor income in the amount of X for 
personal income tax and social benefits, 
respectively;
LIrep is the declared labor income, where 
LIrep ≤ LI.
In this formulation of the model, it 
is obvious that with a constant (actual) 
gross wage, all the benefits from evasion 
are received by the employee. In this case, 
the welfare of the employer does not de-
crease, since, by understating the base, the 
employee actually does not work less than 
in the situation without evasion, and the 
employer does not care who will receive 
the payments: the state (in the case of 
non-evasion) or the employee (in the case 
of evasion). However, with a decrease in 
actual net wages, the benefits will be dis-
tributed between the employee and the 
employer.
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It is important to note that parameter 
LIrep is not fully endogenous, since the pos-
sibility of evasion is largely determined 
by the existing system of institutions, the 
specifics of the industry and the enterprise 
where an individual works. We are going 
to provide empirical evidence to support 
this premise further in this paper. Let us 
take the public sector as an example. As 
much as a public sector employee wants 
to evade taxes, he is unable to do so. In ad-
dition, evasion is often not an individual’s 
deliberate choice, but a condition of re-
cruitment. This situation is especially typi-
cal of the cases when the labor market is 
not entirely competitive. Therefore, in this 
model, parameter LIrep will be considered 
exogenous with respect to the individual’s 
decision.
The solution to this optimization 
problem is equivalent to maximizing the 
following function (2):
( ; ; ) ( ;   )
( ) ( )( ) ( )
 
( ; ; ).
rep rep
C LI C LI
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The system of equations (3) follows 
from the necessary condition for an extre-
mum:
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TI is the total income of an individual. 
Equation (4) follows from the solution 
of the system of equations (3):
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MRSLI.C is the marginal rate of replacement 






















is the marginal rate of social contributions.
Thus, the equilibrium level of labor in-
come is an implicit function of the margi-
nal rates of income tax, social contributions 
and total income: τ τ+ += ( ) ( )
* *
(1 ; )inc socLI LI TILI LI . 
Since between 2010 and 2014 in Russia 
only the system of social contributions 
was reformed, the differential of function 
τ τ+ +( ) ( )
*
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∂ ∂= ⋅ τ + ⋅
∂∂ + τ   
(5)
To transform this equation so that it 
can be interpreted in terms of elasticities, 
we are going to divide both of its sides by 
LI*, multiply each term on the right-hand 
side and divide by the corresponding 
variable of the numerator’s differentia. 








τ= ζ ⋅ + η ⋅














is the elasticity of labor income (before 
personal income tax is withheld) to the 








is the elasticity of total labor income to the 
total income of an individual.
I index in the designation of elastici-
ties means that these elasticities refer to 
estimates of the effects of labor intensity 
(intensive margin). The value of elasti-
city Iζ  will reflect the effect of replacing 
labor with leisure. From equation (6), the 
following specification for econometric 









= α + ζ ⋅ + τ +
+ η ⋅ + ∈            
(7)
It is important to note that this ap-
proach is consistent with the analysis of 
the impact of taxation in the case of a non-
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linear scale, since there is a marginal rate 
in the regression equation, which depends 
on the amount of labor income.
Now let’s look at the effects on la-
bor force participation. When deciding 
whether to work at all, an individual is 
also guided by labor income taxation, 
more specifically, he makes a conditional 
comparison of utility in the case when he 
has a job and when he doesn’t. If we for-
malize this comparison mathematically 
and use the optimal solution LI* obtained 
above, the comparison is carried out be-
tween the following expressions (8):

=
          + + − + −    
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TI0 is the total income of a non-working 
individual.
Thus, the decision to participate in la-
bor force is an implicit function of total in-
come and optimal labor income, excluding 
personal income tax deduction. In [15], the 
decision to participate in labor force also 
depended on nonlabor income since in 
the theoretical model in this article, non-
labor income was taxed on an equal basis 
with labor income. Due to the specifics of 
social contributions, nonlabor income is 
not included in the tax base. Therefore, it 
is enough to restrict ourselves to the use 
of total income, which coincides with the 
nonlabor income for non-working indi-
viduals. In addition, the presence of total 
income and labor income means indirect 
inclusion of nonlabor income in the mo-
del. In turn, the optimal labor income from 
the previous analysis is ( )(
* *
1 ; ).socLI TILI LI +τ=  
Consequently, an individual’s decision to 
participate in labor force can be represen-
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Since our goal is to estimate the proba-
bility of labor participation, expression (9) 
can be reduced to the following form (10):
{ }( )( 1) :1  ,socLIW TIP = +τ=  (10)
P(W = 1) is the probability that the individual 
will work;
  the probability distribution function.
Depending on the choice of function 
 , the logit and / or probit of the binary 
choice model will be built. There is an 
econometric procedure for adjusting esti-
mates for possible non-random selection 
error.
The change in working status can be 
divided into two terms. Let us write out 











Now we will carry out the same ma-
thematical transformations as with equa-
tion (5) to interpret the equation in terms 
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is the elasticity of the probability of a per-
son’s labor force participation at the mar-






is the elasticity of the probability of a per-
son’s labor force participation by his total 
income.
E index in the designation of elastici-
ties means that these elasticities refer to 
estimates of the effects of labor force par-
ticipation (extensive margin). The value of 
elasticity Eζ  will reflect the effect of sub-
stitution of labor for leisure in the limiting 
case. Since the explained variable is dis-
crete (binary), it is necessary to use proba-
bilistic discrete choice models to evaluate 
the effects.
The analysis will use the panel data 
from the Russia Longitudinal Monitoring 
Survey – Higher School of Economics for 
2010–2014. There are two RLMS databas-
es: individual survey results and house-
hold survey results. This structure is ex-
tremely important for the study, since, to 
assess the effects of labor income taxation, 
it will be necessary to supplement the data 
(8)
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on individuals with the characteristics of 
households.
From the model specification it fol-
lows that we need data on how much 
money an individual receives as wages. 
The RLMS questionnaire contains the 
question of how much money a person 
has received as a wage at the main place 
of work over the past 30 days, net of tax. 
Equation specification includes labor in-
come, excluding personal income tax pay-
ments. But since the personal income tax 
rates have not changed over the period, 
this data can be used as the actual labor 
income, because the effect of the personal 
income tax will go into the constant of 
the equation. In addition, similar data are 
available for the second place of work. The 
main explanatory variable is the marginal 
social contribution (tax) rate. The tax base 
is the annual payroll. 
The actual annual payroll was deter-







According to the Russian tax legislation, 
social contribution rates depend on the 
industry in which an individual works. 
The RLMS database contains data on the 
industries of the first and second jobs. In 
accordance with the tax legislation, each 
industry was assigned its own tax sche-
dule by using the RLMS codifier for each 
year. Thus, having determined the actual 
annual payroll and the industry where an 
individual works, each observation was 
assigned its own marginal tax rate. 
Next, we need to decide on the vari-
able of the aggregate income of an indi-
vidual. Despite the fact that the theoreti-
cal model should use his total income by 
analogy with the empirical strategy, [15] 
used the total income of the household 
minus the labor income of the individual 
himself, since he is supported by the funds 
of the entire household. It is also advisable 
to include this variable in the model since 
the decision about how much to work 
may depend on whether other members 
of the household are employed or not. For 
example, all other things being equal, an 
individual’s incentives to work are, on 
average, higher when other members of 
the household are not working or receive 
low wages, since more money is needed 
to support the family. If we include the to-
tal household income in the model, it will 
take into account this situation. This vari-
able is contained in the RLMS for house-
holds. Thanks to the structure of the data-
bases, it is possible to relate an individual 
to his/her household. In addition to the 
main explanatory variables, the model 
also needs to include control variables. 
These variables should reflect the cha-
racteristics of the individual himself, his 
household and the characteristics of the 
place of work. As a standard set of control 
variables characterizing an individual, we 
use gender, age, education, work expe- 
rience, and marital status. As characteris-
tics of the household, we will use the data 
on the total number of members, the num-
ber of dependents (it includes children un-
der 18 as well as people of the retirement 
age and older). 
In addition, the intensive margin is 
influenced by the factors associated with 
regional differentiation and the specifics of 
work. Therefore, it is worth including into 
the model the characteristics of the place 
of work and residence as control variables. 
First, it is worth adding a dummy variable 
indicating the type of settlement – city or 
village. In the RLMS there is a more de-
tailed differentiation – a regional center, 
city, urban-type settlement, and village. In 
order not to overload the model with dum-
my variables, this parameter was trans-
formed: a regional center was taken as a 
city, and an urban-type settlement as a vil-
lage. Also, in the RLMS database there are 
data on the number of employees of a firm 
or enterprise where an individual works. 
This variable is interpreted as the size of a 
firm. In order to include it in the model, we 
have matched the codes of industries from 
the RLMS with those from the All-Russian 
Classifier of Types of Economic Activity 
(RCEAP) database (Appendix 1). All va-
riables measured in rubles are converted 
into real terms (in prices of 2014).
It is worth noting that, if the declared 
income is included in the model as a de-
pendent variable, it will allow us to esti-
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mate the effect of labor intensity, taking 
into account possible tax evasion.
We chose the period of 2010–2014 be-
cause this was the time of the most signifi-
cant changes in tax legislation in terms of 
social contributions. Figure 1 shows the 
dynamics of changes in the marginal rates 
of social contributions corresponding to 
the general tax regime. In addition to the 
general regime, tax legislation provides 
preferential treatment for employees in 
specific industries. In the given period, 
these mostly were workers in agriculture, 
IT and mass media. Thus, additional vari-
ation in the explanatory variable is pro-
vided by a person’s transition from one 
industry to another.
As you can see (Fig. 1), the largest 
increase in tax rates was recorded in 
2010–2011. In addition, changes in tax 
legislation also affected the thresholds. 
The dynamics of the thresholds, starting 
from the changes in the marginal rate, is 
presented below (Fig. 2).
Thus, we can observe a relatively high 
variation in social contributions’ rates, 
which will allow us to obtain more accu-
rate estimates of the elasticity of the labor 
supply. Our assessment of the elasticity of 
labor will help us determine to what ex-
tent the dynamics of revenue from social 
contributions is explained by the reforms 
in the field of labor taxation, namely, by 
changes in social contributions.
The non-linearity of the taxation scale 
creates additional difficulties in evaluating 
equation (7). In this case, it is not enough 
to use only the marginal rate as a regres-
sor, since for individuals whose labor in-
come is above the threshold of the main 
rate of social contributions the marginal 
rate could remain the same but the bud-
get constraint will change its form because 
















2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Under threshold  Above threshold
Fig. 1. Changes in marginal social contribution rates
Source: compiled by the authors based on the information from the Tax Code of the Russian Federation 

















Fig. 2. Changes in thresholds for determining the marginal social contribution rate
Source: compiled by the authors based on the information from the Tax Code of the Russian Federation 
as amended for the corresponding year
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because of the rise in the main rate. In this 
paper, we have included virtual income in 
the variable of total household income.
4. Results
Let us proceed to assessing the effects 
of labor force participation in the elasticity 
of the tax base resulting from the changes 
in labor taxation (extensive margin and 
intensive margin, respectively). We also 
need to take into account the possible 
problem of non-random selection caused 
by the unobserved characteristics of the 
potential place of work for non-working 
individuals.
Considering the econometric estima-
tion of the probability of an individual en-
tering and/or staying in the labor market, 
we must make certain assumptions con-
cerning unobservable characteristics of his 
potential place of work. Salary is a key pa-
rameter in our analysis since the marginal 
rate of social contributions depends on its 
size. Taking into account the distribution 
of workers by wage (for a significant part 
of workers the amount of their wages will 
be below the first threshold), it is advisable 
to assume that the amount that workers 
who are going to enter the labor market 
will earn is below the first threshold, all 
other things being equal (their preferences 
are biased towards leisure). As a substan-
tiation of this premise, we can cite the data 
on the median wages calculated by using 
the Rosstat data (Fig. 3). The figure below 
reflects the significant difference between 
these values. This means that at least a half 
of the workforce receives net wages be-
low the given threshold. It is important to 
note that this gap is quite large, therefore, 
much less than a half of these workers 
receive salaries that exceed the threshold 
values. Since non-working individuals, on 
average, other things being equal, have 
lower earning abilities and / or a rela-
tively higher opportunity cost of leisure 
time. Therefore, we assign to non-working 
individuals a tax rate that corresponds to 
incomes below the threshold. Thus, the 
dependent variable is the probability of an 
individual entering the labor market, and 
the variable of interest is the marginal rate 
of social contributions.
Heckman’s procedure [19] assumes 
at the first step an assessment of the prob-
ability of going to work depending on the 
marginal tax rate on social contributions. 
The table below (Table 1) presents the re-
sults of evaluating the effect of labor force 
participation. As can be seen from the es-
timates, the probability of going to work 
is statistically significantly influenced 
(negatively) by the marginal rate of so-
cial contributions. This result is consistent 
with theoretical concepts. Even though 
formally the employer is the taxpayer, the 
actual tax burden is redistributed between 
the employer and the employee. 
As a result, with an increase in the 
rate of social contributions by 1%, the 
probability of going to work decreases by 



















 Median monthly wage  Monthly thresholds
Fig. 3. Comparison of the median wage and monthly thresholds 
of the social contribution tax scale
Source: compiled by the authors based on the information from the Tax Code of the Russian Federation 
as amended for the corresponding year
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It should be noted that women are more 
sensitive to an increase in tax rates, which 
is also consistent with the results of many 
studies discussed earlier. This result can 
be explained from the point of view of the 
theory of opportunity costs. Women tend 
to do most of the housework and they also 
take a more active part in caring for chil-
dren, so the opportunity costs of going to 
work are much higher for them. Thus, this 
result is consistent with the differentiation 
of social roles by gender. Moreover, there 
is a difference in the signs of the coeffi-
cients with a variable marital status. 
In addition, one should pay attention 
to the fact that it is not the regression co-
efficients themselves to be interpreted, 
but the slope coefficients which show 
the marginal effect for an average person 
in the sample. The signs for the control 
variables are also consistent with the pre-
vious theoretical and empirical research. 
The share of correctly predicted observa-
tions serves as an indicator of the quality 
of the model. In general, we can see that 
the binary choice models are built with 
a fairly high percentage of correctly pre-
dicted observations.
Table 1
Assessment of “the first step” in Heckman procedure 
(evaluating the probability of an individual entering the labor market)
Dependent variable: the individual participates/doesn’t participate in labor force
Regressors
Women (18 and over) Men (18 and over)
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Number of observations 39357 24693
Percentage of correctly predicted 
observations 78.2% 80.8%
Source: compiled by the authors based on the information from the Tax Code of the Russian Federa-
tion as amended for the corresponding year.
Note – Designations in Table 1: * – significance at 10%; **, at 5%; ***, at 1%. The values in parenthe-
ses below the coefficients are standard errors.
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After discussing the results of the 
evaluation of the equation for participa-
tion, one can proceed to the estimates 
of the elasticity of the tax base (Table 2). 
The dependent variable corresponds to 
the monthly wage in real terms (2014 
was chosen as the base year) received by 
an employee. We deflated all wages ac-
cording to regional inflation rates. Ros- 
stat provided the regional data using 2014 
as a base year. The specification of the 
equation includes an individual’s labor 
income, net of personal income tax pay-
ments. Since the personal income tax did 
not change during the period under con-
sideration, these data can be used as the 
actual labor income, since the effect of the 
personal income tax will go into the con-
stant of the equation. Our assessment of 
the regression leads us to the following 
conclusion: an increase in the rate of social 
contributions by 1% results in a decrease 
in net wages by approximately 4.49% and 
by 4.30% for women and men, respective-
ly. It means that an increase in the social 
contribution rates causes a decline in the 
Table 2
Assessment of “the second step” in Heckman procedure 
(evaluating the elasticity of net-of-tax wage)
Dependent Variable: Declared monthly wages
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Number of observations 39357 24693
Standard model error 0.625 0.629
Source: compiled by the authors based on the information from the Tax Code of the Russian Federa-
tion as amended for the corresponding year.
Note – Designations in Table 1: * – significance at 10%; **, at 5%; ***, at 1%. The values in parenthe-
ses below the coefficients are standard errors.
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tax base. The signs at the control variables 
are also consistent with the previous em-
prirical results. The significance of the 
λ – Heckman variable should be high-
lightedt, since it indicates the statistical 
significance of the bias because of the non-
random selection and, therefore, the expe-
diency and necessity of using a censored 
regression (Heckman’s procedure).
These estimates take into account the 
problem of non-random selection and thus 
enable us to assess the fiscal effects of the 
changes in social contribution rates, net of 
other factors. Special attention should be 
paid to the significance of the overwhelm-
ing number of variables, which also indi-
rectly indicates the relatively good quality 
of the econometric models. 
5. Discussion
In this study we assessed the impact 
of tax reforms on the economic behavior 
of individuals in relation to labor acti-
vity in Russia for the period 2010–2014. 
We distinguished between two effects, 
which, in their turn, reflect three possible 
reactions of workers to changes in labor 
income taxation.
The effect of labor intensity shows 
to what extent the equilibrium value of 
monthly wages has changed in response to 
changes in social contribution rates. In ge-
neral, an increase in the rate of social contri-
butions by 1% led to a reduction in wages 
by 4.49% for women and by 4.30% for men. 
The tables below show the fiscal ef-
fects that were calculated on the basis of 
elasticities (coefficients in regressions at 
a variable rate of social contributions), 
namely, increases in tax revenue resul-
ting from reforms of social contributions 
(Tables 3 and 4). Even though the reforms 
of labor income taxation 2010–2014 related 
exclusively to the collection of social con-
tributions, they also influenced the reve-
nue from the personal income tax, since 
labour income taxation and social contri-
butions share the same taxable base. 
Table 3
The growth of budget revenues in current prices (at the beginning of the period) 
raised from employees of the private sector, %
Period
Social contributions Income tax
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
2010–2011 –8.1 –3.3 –6.1 –17.5 –3.2 –0.1 –1.4 –4.6
2011–2012 2.5 0.8 –21.3 –18.0 1.0 0 –5.8 –4.8
2012–2013 –0.1 –0.1 11.2 11.0 0 0 4.6 4.6
2013–2014 –0.1 0 8.3 8.2 0 0 1.2 1.2
Calculated by using the data from the RLMS and Tables 1 and 2.
Note – Explanation of notation: 1 – increase in tax revenues raised from people who earned less 
than the threshold value (intensive margin); 2 – increase in tax revenues raised from people who entered 
the labor market (extensive); 3 – increase in tax revenues raised from people with wages above the 
threshold; 4 – the sum of the first three: the total increase in tax revenues.
Table 4
The growth of budget revenues in current prices (at the beginning of the period) 
raised from employees of the state sector, %
Period
Social contributions Income tax
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
2010–2011 –3.6 –0.1 –1.6 –5.3 –6.7 –0.1 –0.5 –7.2
2011–2012 1.2 0 –6.9 –5.8 2.1 0 -4.8 –2.7
2012–2013 0 0 11.2 5.8 0 0 1.5 1.5
2013–2014 0 0 1.4 1.3 –0.1 0 0.4 0.3
Calculated by using the data from the RLMS NRU-HSE and Tables 1 and 2.
Note – Explanation of notation: 1 – increase in tax revenues raised from people who earned less 
than the threshold value (intensive margin); 2 – an increase in tax revenues raised from people who 
entered the labor market (extensive); 3 – increase in tax revenues raised from people with wages above 
the threshold; 4 – the sum of the first three: the total increase in tax revenues.
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In the current institutional environ-
ment, the burden from social contribu-
tions is already excessive. In other words, 
the state has already exhausted the oppor-
tunities for increasing social contributions 
and pushing the reforms further would 
mean jeopardizing budget revenues and 
fiscal sustainability. The growth in the 
revenue from social contributions is deter-
mined bythe growth in the revenue from 
public sector institutions, which means, 
in essence, transferring funds from “one 
budgetary pocket” to another. Moreover, 
there may be other factors at play here, 
unrelated to changes in the schedule of so-
cial contributions. 
To this it should be added that the in-
crease of social contributions had a nega-
tive impact on revenues from the personal 
income tax, which means that in general, 
the fiscal effects of the reforms were nega-
tive rather than positive.
6. Conclusion
Our hypothesis about the two effects 
of labour income taxes was confirmed: 
a 1%-increase in the social contribution 
rate leads to a 3.0% and 3.1% average 
decrease in labour participation for men 
and women, respectively. Moreover, a 
1%-increase in the social contribution rate 
causes a 4.3% and 4.5% average decrease 
in net-of-tax wages for men and women, 
respectively.
These results mean that an increase 
in the social contribution rate has nega-
tively affected the fiscal revenues from 
social contributions and the personal 
income tax. The fiscal effects of the re-
forms appear to be negative rather than 
positive. Thus, we would recommend 
the government to revise the social con-
tribution rates. Since the labour market is 
highly sensitive, it is possible to raise tax 
revenue through other means thus avoi-
ding adverse effects on public welfare.
The high elasticity of labor partici-
pation to the rate of social contributions 
suggests that it is advisable to reduce the 
rate of social contributions for low income 
levels. However, this requires a separate 
calculation since any decrease in rates for 
lower levels of income can have a strong 
effect on income (the so-called mechanical 
effect of changes in tax rates). At the same 
time, the more individuals there are in the 
population with low sensitivity of wages 
to tax rates on labor income, the higher is 
the risk that the fiscal effect of this mea-
sure will be insignificant.
A decrease in the basic rate of social 
contributions carries even greater risks 
of a negative mechanical effect. Howe-
ver, it may be worthwhile to consider 
a scenario where a reduction in one tax 
rate will be compensated by an increase 
in another rate for different groups of 
taxpayers.
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